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Introduction
National political economies and their skill formation systems face increasing liberaliza-
tion and deindustrialization pressures, related to factors such as growing global com-
petition, the rise of the service sector, and rapid technological developments (Streeck 
2009; Mayer and Solga 2008). The literature on institutional change discusses different 
reactions to such increasing pressures. While some authors identify a process of policy 
conversion along the lines of liberalization (Albo 2005; Baccaro and Howell 2011), oth-
ers highlight the variation in how systems liberalize (Thelen 2012, 2014). For example, 
Thelen (2012) finds that political economies differ in the extent to which they main-
tain strategic employer coordination to achieve joint economic gains, on the one hand, 
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and equality, on the other hand. It is crucial to understand the effects on equality and 
employer coordination because both aspects represent central features of political econ-
omies and their welfare systems (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Martin and Swank 2008).
In order to understand different trajectories of liberalization, studying collective skill 
formation systems, which are located at the intersection of education and labour mar-
ket policies, can generate insightful answers. Collective skill formation systems build on 
the cooperation among state actors, employers, and unions for the purpose of providing 
vocational education and training (VET) for a broad share of the population (Culpepper 
and Finegold 1999; Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012; Emmenegger et al. 2019). However, 
pressures on firms to cost-minimize along with global competition and swift changes 
in skill demands in the post-industrial era may reduce the number of apprenticeship 
positions. This risks leaving many young people, specifically those with a weaker profile, 
without training contracts and, in the longer term, unemployed (Koudahl 2010). Policy 
actors must therefore pay attention to the fragile balance between broader societal inter-
ests and firms’ voluntary, but market-driven, willingness to participate as training-pro-
viders (Martin and Knudsen 2010; Carstensen and Ibsen 2019; Durazzi and Geyer 2019).
Collective skill formation systems are under pressure to adapt. However, institutional 
change is “eminently political” (Hall and Thelen 2009, p. 27) and change in collective 
skill formation systems is influenced by the way the governance of VET incorporates the 
(often competing) interests of the different stakeholders, which can be linked to specific 
trajectories of liberalization. Thelen and Busemeyer (2012) show that the German VET 
system moves from collectivism to segmentalism, due to the increasing influence of large 
firms at the expense of cross-sectoral interests and collectivist solutions. Such duali-
zation tendencies are argued to most likely occur in countries with sector or industry 
coordination (Thelen 2012): more specifically where export-oriented manufacturing sec-
tors are dominant in the political economy. Drawing on the Danish VET system, Thelen 
(2014) identifies a trend towards embedded flexibilization and modularization. In this 
case, new forms of flexibility enable vulnerable groups to get and keep good jobs (ibid., 
p. 14). At the same time, these policies are embedded in encompassing frameworks that 
collectivize social risks such as unemployment or skill shortages. In contrast to Ger-
many, the Danish economy is characterized by a pluralist business community where the 
manufacturing sectors are not dominant (Ibsen and Thelen 2017). This is seen as a key 
factor to how Denmark has managed to maintain its high level of solidarity and equality 
through high-level state capacity. The literature argues that this type of liberalization is 
typical for Scandinavian, social democratic welfare states (Korpi and Palme 1998; Nelson 
2012; Carstensen and Ibsen 2019).
We argue that political economies can also find a way to react to liberalization pres-
sures in which equality is kept on a high level in combination with employer coordi-
nation even increasing, for instance, in the form of joint activities through employer 
associations. In the case of Switzerland, we identify embedded flexibilization that is 
characterized by what we call ‘polite employer domination’ (inspired by Pepper Cul-
pepper’s seminal work Quiet Politics and Business Power from 2010). We refer to ‘polite 
employer domination’ as the strong but not very ‘loud’ role and influence of employers in 
policy reform processes which can eventually lead to the delegation of key competences 
to employers.
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Switzerland—a coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001), albeit a more 
liberal variant (Iversen and Stephens 2008; Becker 2009; Mach and Trampusch 2011)—is 
a core collective skill formation system in which employer coordination through associa-
tions and apprenticeship training is even more significant than in Denmark or Germany 
(Ryan 2012). In particular, the “strong tradition of self-regulation by economic associa-
tions” (Mach and Trampusch 2011, p. 15) makes Switzerland an interesting case to study 
how institutions react and adapt to global competition and liberalization processes. 
Thus, by adding Switzerland to the debate, we generate general insights into the role of 
business in collective governance structures.
We illustrate our argument by zooming in on a relatively new policy domain to which 
the literature on institutional change in VET systems refers, namely the introduction 
of short-track dual training (‘short-tracks’) (Thelen and Busemeyer 2012; Thelen 2014). 
These short-tracks target young people that have difficulties accessing regular-length 
apprenticeship programmes. We argue that short-tracks make good examples of the 
mentioned ‘fragile balance’ between broader social interests (providing access to train-
ing for disadvantaged groups) and firms’ willingness to provide apprenticeships. Short-
tracks entail theory-reduced, applied training and typically last 2  years (in contrast to 
3- and 4-year regular training). They build on the same collective skill formation logic 
as the regular programmes and are an integral part of dual VET, leading to standard-
ized and recognized certificates, but are easier to access and to complete compared to 
the regular programmes. Three dual VET systems went through reform processes imple-
menting standardized dual short-tracks, namely Denmark, Germany, and Switzerland.
As an empirical case, we concentrate on the VET reform process in Switzerland in 
the late 1990s and 2000s. This reform introduced standardized short-track training 
programmes as an additional training path with a distinctive new VET certificate tar-
geting disadvantaged candidates. The highly collective nature of the Swiss VET govern-
ance coupled with relatively little state intervention in VET policy (Trampusch 2010; 
Armingeon 2011; Gonon and Maurer 2012) makes it an interesting case in the family 
of collective skill formation systems. In as much as Switzerland combines the elements 
of lesser state influence and highly collectively organized business interest, we see the 
potential to add key insights to the puzzle of trajectories of liberalization. Therefore, 
analysing how short-tracks were introduced, our study asks what trajectory of liberaliza-
tion, if any, the Swiss VET system displays in view of the newly introduced short-track 
training programmes?
We find that the introduction of short-track training programmes in Switzerland rep-
resents a case of embedded flexibilization characterized by ‘polite employer domination’. 
The state was the key initiator of the reform and used layering to introduce new training 
programmes for disadvantaged—before retreating again to allow business to regain con-
trol over their implementation in a collective governance set-up. Our research uncov-
ers how the strong position of employers influenced the reform process, even though 
business did not take a very proactive stance on the issue. This polite domination refers 
to the passive but salient way in which the employers’ camp asserted its interest. Nev-
ertheless, the state was able to enhance access to vocational training for disadvantaged 
students. Our findings help to better understand the capacity of collective skill forma-
tion systems to adapt to liberalization pressures. We present a case that shows that 
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embedded flexibilization can also come in a variation in which both social equality and 
employer coordination maintain high levels—which is an unexpected finding in the view 
of established trajectories of liberalization. Thus, this is a case where the VET system 
implements embedded flexibilization but circumvents substantial liberalization.
The following section explains our research design and describes our method and 
data. The subsequent section analyses the hitherto underexplored Swiss case in detail. In 
the final section, we interpret and discuss our findings.
Analysing change through trajectories of liberalization
Our research draws on contemporary literature on the trajectories of liberalization 
(Thelen and Busemeyer 2012; Thelen 2014; Carstensen and Ibsen 2019). This section 
introduces three trajectories of liberalization against which our Swiss case can then be 
discussed. Ultimately we find that embedded flexiblization is the key trajectory in our 
case, so it is given special attention in this section. Furthermore, we briefly draw on the 
literature on modes of institutional change in vocational education and training (e.g. 
Thelen 2004, 2014; Trampusch 2010; Martin 2017) which further sharpens our analyti-
cal perspective on the actor constellations as well as the characteristics of the political 
context.
Thelen (2012, 2014) has criticized the prevalent one-dimensional understanding of lib-
eralization as a (declining) degree of coordination. She argues that liberalization can be 
analytically captured within a two-dimensional field in which strategic employer coordi‑
nation (‘x-axis’) and equality (‘y-axis’) play the central role. In relation to skill formation, 
Thelen (2014, p. 109ff) refers to three key aspects of training which she uses to charac-
terize institutional change. Firstly, is the access to training narrow (selective) or broad, 
thus does it support equality or not? Secondly, does the content underline specific or 
general skills and to which extent do employers cooperate to develop the training con-
tent? Thirdly, what (different) paths does the training system offer? Furthermore, the rel-
ative power of the organized interest, especially the influence of business actors, shapes 
the trajectories of change (Thelen 2014, pp. 30–31). Where the manufacturing sector is 
export-oriented and predominantly composed of large firms, its influence is high and 
the state is more likely to shape (VET) policies that align with employers’ interests (ibid, 
pp. 30–31). In contrast, where the business camp is diverse, neither dominated by large 
or small firms nor export-oriented per se and not dominated by the manufacturing sec-
tor, employers’ influence is lower and the state has more leeway to pursue policies that 
are more oriented to social solidarity (in the VET policy context). Based on these factors, 
the literature distinguishes between three ideal typical models of liberalization.
Firstly, ‘deregulatory liberalization’ is characterized by declining coverage rates and 
the “active dismantling of coordinating capacities” of the employers (Thelen 2014, p. 
13). This trajectory might, for instance, imply that rules and regulations in place to pro-
tect collective interests are dismantled in favour of more business- and market-friendly 
policies (see e.g. Streeck 2009, p. 13). With regard to vocational training, this trajec-
tory translates into low standardization and low levels of cooperation. The state plays a 
minor role while market players are relatively free to design content and access regula-
tions. Deregulatory liberalization is often considered to take place through institutional 
displacement.
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The second ideal type is ‘dualization’ (or ‘segmentalism’) (Emmenegger et  al. 2012; 
Häusermann and Schwander 2012). It is characterized by a “distinct narrowing in the 
number of firms and workers covered” by traditional corporatist regulations (Thelen 
2014, p. 14). Institutions that facilitate collective action do not disappear, but institu-
tional ‘drift’ makes them less encompassing because coordination happens more on the 
sector- and firm-levels—rather than covering the employers and the work force as a 
whole. For example, some core firms and industries are coordinating and can therefore 
exert influence over state policies (such as VET), whereas others cannot. Large business 
players especially strengthen their influence in training and adapt training to their needs 
and internal labour markets. Furthermore, the state is assumed to be more compliant to 
pressure from this business interest group, due to its relative economic importance.
Thirdly, there is the ‘embedded flexibilization’ type of liberalization, which “involves 
the introduction of new forms of flexibility within the context of continued strong and 
encompassing framework that collectivizes risk” (Thelen 2014, p. 14). Training sys-
tems are made more flexible by introducing new training paths and training schemes 
that can be tailored to individual needs. This trajectory of institutional change implies 
that a high level of solidarity and inclusiveness can be maintained even in the face of 
the flexibilization of labour market institutions. This is achieved by empowering vulner-
able (worker) groups to thrive in a changing labour market while simultaneously main-
taining the participation and support of the employers’ side. Broad access to training, 
including disadvantaged groups, plays an important role and is actively supported by the 
state. However, the encompassingness of employers’ cooperation is reduced especially 
due to state intervention. This is potentially linked to a partial disengagement of employ-
ers from apprenticeship training, as their influence in this form of training is reduced 
(Jørgensen 2015; Carstensen and Ibsen 2019). In contrast to the dualization trajectory, 
manufacturing interests are typically less pronounced and dominant within organized 
business (Thelen 2014, p. 31). This leads to a more pluralist balanced power relation 
between different interests (e.g. manufacturing and service sectors) and opens up space 
for state agents to strengthen the position of vulnerable groups (Huber and Stephens 
2000; Martin and Swank 2012). In their study of institutional change in the Danish VET 
system, Carstensen and Ibsen (2019) show how the state—under conditions of a left-
wing government—is able to broker policy reforms in a coalition with trade unions that 
may both benefit employers and retain a degree of equality for the disadvantaged.
In instances where trade unions play an important role in the collective skill formation 
setting, this actor group may be a vehicle for inclusive policy change. In a comparison 
of VET reforms in Germany and Austria, Durazzi and Geyer (2019) show that while the 
Austrian unions together with the state were able to promote inclusive vocational train-
ing options for disadvantaged candidates, the German unions’ opposition to a similar 
training programme disabled the possibility for such a policy.
We analyse the Swiss VET reform process involving the short-track programmes 
against the backdrop of these different trajectories of liberalization. Employer coordina-
tion and employer domination play a key role in identifying the different trajectories. 
We understand ’employer coordination’ as joint activities between different employers, 
for example, when employer associations enable the coordination of training content. 
We understand ‘employer domination’ as the influence the business camp exercises on 
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policy making. In our case study, this influence surfaces in the decision-making process 
but it is especially the policy-outcome that reflects employer power: employers hold key 
competences after the reform. We find that the influence of employers is rooted in the 
state’s anticipation of business’ gatekeeper role but also the ability of the associations to 
coordinate, bundle and then voice their common interests. Thus, in our case, employer 
domination and employer coordination are closely related.
To support our endeavour to discern to which trajectory (if any) the development of 
short-tracks in Switzerland adheres, we further draw on the theory of gradual institu-
tional change, which complements our toolbox to capture change processes in collec-
tive skill formation. More specifically, Streeck and Thelen (2005) describe four specific 
modes of gradual change: (a) displacement, referring to the introduction of new rules, 
(b) layering, implying that new rules are added on top of old ones  (see also Schickler 
2001), (c) drift, linked to a changed impact of a given rule  (see also Hacker 2005) and 
(d) conversion, referring to a new interpretation of a rule. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) 
argue that layering and drift are more likely to occur than displacement or conversion in 
a context in which defenders of the status quo hold strong veto possibilities.1 However, 
changes through drift as well as conversion are less likely if the level of discretion in 
interpreting or enforcing an institution is low.2
Methods and data
Our research relies on secondary literature as well as primary sources. We interviewed 
ten Swiss VET experts. These experts were selected based on their professional knowl-
edge about short-tracks and to cover all three main actor groups: employers, unions and 
state actors (see Appendix for the list of interviews). The interviews were semi-struc-
tured including open-ended questions. Due to the relatively long time period that has 
passed since the initial phase of the policy reform process, our expert interviews mostly 
informed the latter phases of our analysis. In addition, this paper builds on several expert 
interviews carried out in Denmark and Germany—as our shadow comparative cases 
(Hancké 2009, pp. 75–77)—within the framework of our previous comparative research 
on collective skill formation. That is, in some instances we allude to these two cases 
for illustrative purposes. In addition to the expert interviews, we analysed transcripts 
from parliamentary VET commission debates, documents of the consultation process 
between the state, employers and other private stakeholders, as well as other written 
policy material. To get access to this large corpus of documents (2400 pages in total) 
through the Swiss national archive, we had to guarantee to treat them confidentially. To 
the best extent, our two main data sources (i.e. the expert interviews and the document 
analysis) were used to mutually validate the respective evidence (triangulation by valida-
tion, see Peters 1998, p. 97–99). However, interviewees were not confronted with confi-
dential government documents.
Furthermore, we rely on within-case analysis to untangle complicated relationships 
and causal linkages related to the development of short-tracks. An important method to 
1 This is because—unlike layering and drift—conversion and displacement require direct changes to the targeted institu-
tion.
2 The reason is that—unlike layering or displacement—both these modes rely on significant leeway in how the institu-
tions are implemented.
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identify such causal relations is process tracing, which is guided by the question “what 
links causal factors, events, sequences and outcomes together” (Trampusch and Palier 
2016, p. 442). In other words, which step leads to the next, and what factor(s) ultimately 
lead to the outcome we observe? This way of doing process tracing is what Collier (2011, 
p. 823) describes as the “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and 
analysed in the light of the research question”. With the help of process tracing, in the 
next section we start shedding light on the power relations, the role of the state and the 
socio-political context surrounding the reforms introducing the 2-year programmes in 
the Swiss case.
Results: the Swiss case of embedded flexibilization and polite employer 
domination
The major Swiss VET reform of 2002 brought flexibilization of training, especially with 
regard to the length and certification of VET, while strengthening the attractiveness 
of dual VET for disadvantaged persons and maintaining high levels of employer coor-
dination. The following two subsections elaborate on the trajectory along the lines of 
embedded flexibilization and the inclusiveness character of short-tracks as well as the 
related employer influence, respectively. This leads to our argument that short-tracks are 
a case of employer-dominated embedded flexibilization. The third subsection offers an 
in-depth process tracing and further establishes that this initially contested change was 
enabled through layering.
Inclusiveness enhancing short‑track apprenticeships: a case of embedded flexibilization
Dual vocational training is deeply rooted in Switzerland. About two-thirds of gradu-
ates from compulsory education (usually at the age of 16) enter dual vocational train-
ing (SERI 2017, p. 3). As any collective skill formation system, Swiss VET is based on 
the voluntary engagement of firms offering training positions. VET governance is highly 
influenced by business associations. However, the business camp is neither dominated 
by export-oriented or manufacturing sectors (Gonon and Maurer 2012). In contrast to 
other educational policy fields in Switzerland (e.g. general education), VET governance 
is rather centralized and coordinated at the national level (Gonon and Maurer 2012). 
VET training enjoys a high reputation among students as well as employers (Graf 2013). 
The share of pupils attending VET is substantive and the finding that, in the case of Ger-
man-speaking Switzerland, better grades in mathematics actually increase the probabil-
ity that a student will choose to pursue VET (instead of general education), is a strong 
indicator for its standing amongst pupils with high educational attainment (Glauser and 
Becker 2016). However, in the 1990s, the economic downturn led to a retreat of many 
firms from the apprenticeship system. The number of available apprenticeship positions 
declined which excluded many candidates from dual VET. Pressures caused by the eco-
nomic downturn threatened to lead to a further decline in apprenticeship training. As a 
reaction, in a process initiated by the state, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the national 
VET law was revised and entered into force in 2004.
Prior to this reform, there was only one standardized initial VET qualification on 
the national level. All initial vocational training programmes (berufliche Grundbil‑
dung) in Switzerland were certified with a Federal Vocational Diploma (Eidgenössisches 
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Fähigkeitszeugnis). Some training programmes, depending on the occupation, took 
2  years and others 3  years. However, there was no differentiation along educational 
levels or certification. Furthermore, the VET law of 1978 had introduced ‘pre-training’ 
(Anlehre) targeting “mainly practically talented” candidates (BBG 1978, p. 1127). Yet, the 
pre-training did not contain a final examination nor a standardized VET certificate.
The reform of 2002 added an additional layer to initial vocational training by intro-
ducing a new formal educational level, next to the traditional one. These two levels are 
distinguished by their different duration and the certification. The new VET law defines 
that 3- and 4-year training programmes lead to a ‘diploma’ (Fähigkeitszeugnis) while 
2-year training programmes are awarded with a ‘certificate’ (Attest). The law specifies 
that the 2-year training programmes should be “adjusted to the specific requirements of 
the apprentices” (BBG 2002 Art. 17). For the first time, the national VET system offers 
two different VET certificates that are both standardized and recognized on the national 
level. In other words, the reform added an additional training track to the system that 
by law targets disadvantaged candidates. The law even establishes a legal claim for indi-
vidual support measures for apprentices in 2-year training programmes who are at risk 
of failing their examinations (BBG 2002 Art.18). These individual support measures 
include, for example, an adjustment of the training duration, individual counselling ses-
sions in school or case management (Stern and von Dach 2018).
We find that the short-tracks represent a trend towards inclusiveness enhancing 
flexibilization with the help of layering. Thus far, the State Secretariat for Education, 
Research and Innovation (SBFI) has conducted three large-scale evaluations (in 2010, 
2016 and 2017) that show that the short-tracks are a successful training option for dis-
advantaged: Since 2004, candidates as well as firms have an additional option to receive 
and offer vocational training. The access to the traditionally selective vocational training 
system is broadened as it is made easier for disadvantaged candidates to find and com-
plete an apprenticeship. Additionally, the individual support measures (anchored in the 
law and applied when needed) also represent increasing flexibility in training provision 
(on the micro/individual level). These social support measures supplement a standard-
ized core, as training content and certification are standardized.
The individual support measures are organized and financed by the state (the can-
tons) (Stern and von Dach 2018). In addition, (some of ) the cantonal training offices 
get involved in motivating firms to offer short-track apprenticeships (INT7, INT10). In 
fact, the cost–benefit ratio on the side of employers offering short-track was shown to 
be slightly positive on average (Fuhrer and Schweri 2010). In total, short-tracks make up 
about one tenth of all apprenticeships (SBFI 2016, p. i).
In short-tracks, about one-third of the apprentices come from a bridging measure such 
as an additional year at school or preparatory courses (SBFI 2016, p. 27). On average, 
2-year apprentices are older than their counterparts in 3- or 4-year training programmes 
are. About half of the apprentices are older than 20 years (ibid., p. 29) and about one-
third has a migration background (non-Swiss passport) (ibid., p. 31). The dropout rate 
(25%) is higher than in the 3- and 4-year training programmes (ibid., p. 23) but 94% of 
those who try, pass the final examination (ibid., p. 23). About 85% of the graduates enter 
the labour market or continue training (about 40% of the graduates enter a 3- or 4-year 
training) after graduation—in contrast to 94% of graduates from the longer training 
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programmes (ibid., p. 24). The share of short-track apprentices (of all apprentices) varies 
greatly by region (between 1 and 5%) (ibid., p. 22). In the French speaking part (Imdorf 
et al. 2016), the share is much lower compared to the German speaking part. This differ-
ence is rooted in lower reputation of VET in this region, in general, but of short-tracks, 
in particular. In the French speaking part, short-tracks are seen as an emergency solu-
tion and local public VET offices check why a candidate signs up ‘only’ for a short-track 
instead of a regular programme. Whenever possible, they try to arrange ‘regular’ train-
ing instead of a short-track (INT3, INT4).
Despite the lower acceptance in the French speaking part, and sectoral differences in 
participation rates (details below), short-tracks successfully became an integral part of 
the vocational training system. Short-tracks offer an attractive training option for a spe-
cific target group. Indeed, the socio-economic characteristics of the apprentices in short-
tracks indicate that short-tracks do increase inclusiveness of the traditionally selective 
VET system. From this point of view, the state was very successful in introducing an 
inclusiveness enhancing training option. However, we argue that a closer look reveals 
that it is the employers who are in the driving seat when it comes to the governance and 
implementation of short tracks.
Employer domination of short‑tracks
Even though the state has a great interest in the successful implementation of short-
tracks, these programmes build on the voluntary engagement of employers (for instance, 
there are no direct public financial subsidies for training firms) and key competencies 
are in the hands of the employers.
Short-tracks build on the voluntary participation of employers in two ways. Firstly, 
in Switzerland, so-called ‘Organizations of the Working World’ (Organisationen der 
Arbeitswelt), i.e. private multi-actor intermediary associations, are responsible for key 
governance tasks, such as content definition, and they decide if a short-track appren-
ticeship programme is developed in their respective occupational field in the first place. 
These organizations mainly represent occupational and employers’ interests and, thus, 
are driven by the market (INT9). In 2019, the number of short-track apprenticeship 
programmes reached 60 (compared to 180 3- and 4-year apprenticeship programmes) 
(SDBB 2019).
However, there is variation in the implementation and demand for short-tracks 
among different sectors. By far, the highest number of short-tracks can be found in retail 
(Detailhandelassistent/in EBA). Its share stood at 23% in 2018 (BFS 2019). Short-tracks 
in the field of health and social services represent 14% of all short-tracks, followed by 
short-tracks in construction (11%), hospitality and catering (7%) and metal construction 
(7%) (BFS 2019, Tab 2b). In comparison, 20% of the 3- and 4-year trainings are located 
in the field of administration and economics, 10% in retail, 7% in construction and 6% in 
nursing (BFS 2019, Tab 1b).
The outcome of the reform clearly matches the interests of employers. Employers 
asserted their position in a ‘quiet’ way. In other words, they did not have to push their 
position very proactively because policy-makers anticipated employers’ power. The 
arguments brought forward, for example, in the parliamentary debate and discussions in 
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the reform committee—“We do not want to make a new VET law that reduces the will-
ingness of companies to train” (WKB meeting March 1, 2001)—reflect that the policy 
makers strongly anticipated the preferences of business (INT6).
At the same time, the strong employer involvement underlines the collective charac-
ter of the short-tracks. Collective governance structures are not undermined—instead, 
short-tracks are embedded into the traditional vocational governance system. However, 
this dependency on the market can to some extent limit the state’s direct influence on 
the inclusiveness character of the short-tracks.
Against this backdrop, it is interesting to note that the Swiss case of embedded flexibi-
lization is different from the Danish version. While in Denmark, the state weakens some 
of the collective structures (Jørgensen 2015), the Swiss short-tracks are part of the tra-
ditional collective governance structure while at the same time increasing accessibility 
for disadvantaged students. The Swiss example shows that embedded flexibilization does 
not have to come with a decline in collective governance and is not restricted to Scandi-
navian social democratic market economies. However, critics fear that the competitive 
selection process (firms choosing the candidates) leads to a creaming effect, meaning 
that the most disadvantaged candidates may not make it into short-tracks (Kammer-
mann et al. 2018; INT5). Thus, it needs to be recognized that Swiss short-tracks might 
not always reach and include the most disadvantaged candidates.
In sum, we find that the reform in the late 1990s/early 2000s flexibilised the training 
system in favour of disadvantaged candidates while remaining clearly in the hands of 
the employers. We next apply process tracing to understand the origins and evolution of 
short-track training in the Swiss case.
Tracing the policy process
We identify three critical historical phases in the reform process: (I) the apprenticeship 
crisis in the 1990s and first policy proposals; (II) the complex multi-actor legislative pro-
cess by consultation in the late 1990s; and (III) the institutionalization of short-tracks in 
the early 2000s and the new VET law of 2004.
Phase I: apprenticeship crisis in the 1990s and first policy proposals
In this section, we show that in Switzerland the flexibilization of VET was driven by state 
actors who were facing rising youth unemployment in the 1990s. Despite the business 
camp initially expressing its opposition to use vocational training to integrate disadvan-
taged students, the Swiss state actors started to develop additional vocational training 
programmes that would focus on practical training.
In the 1990s, due to economic downturn, the number of applicants exceeded the num-
ber of available training positions by far and youth unemployment rose steeply (Theiss 
1996; Müller and Schweri 2012, p. 25). This crisis ignited a general societal and political 
debate on the VET system. Pressured by the Swiss parliament, the Swiss government 
(Bundesrat) published a report on the ‘state of the art’ of the Swiss vocational system 
in 1996 (Bundesrat 1996; CH5). This report stressed that ‘practically talented’ (prak‑
tisch begabte) candidates should not be automatically “guided into school-based train-
ing” (Bundesrat 1996, p. 5). Instead, the report suggested to flexibilise apprenticeships, 
thus to allow adjustments with regard to the duration and requirement levels (ibid., 
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p. 9). However, the government did not want to change the legal basis but suggested 
minor adjustments such as the development of a tool to assess supply and demand on 
the apprenticeship market or to increase its support for the cantons to integrate foreign 
youth into the labour market. It offered to use a 10 Mio CHF budget (ibid., p. 14).
However, the parliament and the unions harshly criticized the suggested measure-
ments for not tackling the structural problems in VET (Strahm 2008; Polito 2014). The 
political debate intensified and the Science, Education and Culture Committee of the 
parliament (Kommissionen für Wissenschaft, Bildung und Kultur (SECC)) played a cen-
tral role in it. For this commission, the questions about how to increase the number of 
apprenticeship positions in firms and how to integrate more (disadvantaged) candidates 
into dual VET were the driving force (see the SECC mandate “incentive scheme” from 
January 10, 1997). As the situation on the apprenticeship market did not improve and 
political pressure grew, the government launched two immediate support packages 
(Lehrstellenbeschluss I and II) in 1997 and 1999 worth 160 Mio CHF (WBK 1999). The 
first package focused on measures and projects to increase the number of apprentice-
ship positions, for example, through stronger engagement of the cantonal VET offices 
or subsidies for advertisement campaigns. Furthermore, the first package supported 
pilot projects that developed training opportunities for those with difficulties to find an 
apprenticeship training. These included, for example, bridging educational offers such 
as an additional year at school and preparatory courses. It is the second package that 
specifically proposes to develop “new occupations” that “require mainly applied tasks” to 
create new training options (Bundesversammlung 1999, p. 2).
Before the second package was granted, it was important to the parliament to hear the 
opinion of employers. For this purpose, Herrmann (1997) conducted a survey among 
employers, commissioned by the parliament. This effort underlines the importance of 
the preferences of employers to the policy makers. The results of the survey showed that 
employers were very reluctant to open more vocational training for disadvantaged stu-
dents. They emphasized that apprenticeship training should not be a means to integrate 
weaker students. Rising skill demands would not allow them to accept weak candidates 
(Herrmann 1997).
The employers made clear that they consider solely the state to be responsible for sup-
porting disadvantaged students, for example, through state-funded preparatory courses 
(Herrmann 1997). However, even though the business camp expressed its opposition to 
facilitate access for disadvantaged persons to VET, the second support package granted 
40 Mio CHF to explore occupational training fields with “mainly applied tasks” (Bundes-
versammlung 1999, p. 3). In the parliament, the package received “wide support” from 
all parties without discussions on the content (Schlumpf 1999). However, the support 
package did not include any binding regulations, which essentially left the employers’ 
autonomy with regards to training provision for the disadvantaged intact. Instead, the 
package offered funding for pilot projects that would test and evaluate new training 
approaches.
The development and preparation of the support packages (and later the new VET 
law) was mainly driven forward by public actors, namely the Science, Education and 
Culture Committee of the parliament and the parliament itself (INT8). However, 
it has to be pointed out that this committee regularly invited representatives from 
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various stakeholders including unions, the trade sector (Gewerbe) and representa-
tives from the VET teachers (Berufsbildung Schweiz) (minutes SECC meeting January 
14/15, 2002, INT8). With regard to the idea to introduce short-tracks, however, there 
was very little pro-active involvement of business actors in this phase (INT7, INT9). 
Business was not very ‘loud’ in the policy process around the establishment of the 
short-tracks. Rather, the state—which in the Swiss case has been found to be strongly 
interested in a well-functioning and stable training system (Seitzl and Emmenegger 
2019, p. 153)—was under pressure to react to declining numbers of apprenticeship 
positions and a growing number of unemployed youths.
Finally, in 1998, the government appointed an expert group to start the revision 
process of the VET law. Even though the support packages technically were mainly 
financial means, the second package especially functioned as a key point of orienta-
tion for the revision (Strahm 2008). Representatives of the trade association (Gew‑
erbeverband), unions, employer associations and politicians were members of the 
expert group (Strahm 2008). The new VET law proposal and an explanatory report 
were presented in May 1999. The expert group report addresses the need to create 
more training opportunities for those facing difficulties entering dual training—an 
agreement that indicates the common understanding among policy makers as well 
as union and employer representatives of the seriousness of the issue of entry bar-
riers to training for disadvantaged youth. The group’s report refers to the negative 
image of the pre-training (‘second-order’ training) and argues that the pre-training 
was not able to reach enough candidates in need (EVD 1999, p. 11). Furthermore, the 
expert group report highlights that growing differentiation in the world of employ-
ment requires “more flexible” levels of qualification (EVD 1999, p. 12, 22).
The report also suggested that the law defines the duration of a regular apprentice-
ship to take at least 3  years (EVD 1999, p. 22). Additionally, the VET law proposal 
should introduce ‘applied vocational training’ (berufspraktische Bildung) (EVD 1999, 
pp. 26–27), a training opportunity that can be adjusted to “individual competences” 
but that can also be used to establish demanding training programmes that take less 
than 3 years. Applied vocational training focuses on work-based training (EVD 1999, 
p. 36) and apprentices with learning difficulties should be supported by individual 
support measures (EVD 1999, p. 27). This new training level would be linked to a 
new VET degree. The policy proposal suggested granting graduates from the applied 
vocational training usually a 2-year ‘federal VET certificate’ (Berufsattest), while the 
regular ‘federal VET diploma’ (Fähigkeitszeugnis) would last 3 or 4 years (EVD 1999, 
p. 36).
Overall, these statements reflect the strong interest of the state to strengthen the 
social dimension of vocational training. However, it is also important to note that the 
state refers to the changing demands on the labour market as the primary driving 
forces for change. It argues that training has to adapt to the changes that “the labour 
market dictates” (EVD 1999, p. 11). The needs of the disadvantaged students come 
second (see EVD 1999, p. 22), which underscores the considerations and standpoint 
of the employers with regards to the 2-year programmes. The policy proposal by the 
expert group, thus, reflects a compromise of two camps. On the one hand, the pro-
posal introduces a new training option to enhance the integration of disadvantaged 
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candidates. On the other hand, the proposal highlights that economic demand is the 
driving force for the introduction of new training tracks. The proposal strengthens 
the traditional apprenticeships but introduces an additional option for disadvantaged 
students.
Phase II: the complex multi‑actor legislative process by consultation in the late 1990s
The new VET law proposal was on the table by 1999 and suggested the introduction of 
an additional VET level and certification. In this section, we argue that the reactions by 
key players to this proposal can be divided into three main lines of argument. Firstly, the 
cantons and the unions welcomed short-tracks as a social measure to increase inclu-
siveness of VET. Secondly, occupational and employer associations were not in favour 
of the idea of lower level training because they saw the danger of devaluation of tradi-
tional VET and additional costs due to more intense supervision of short-track appren-
tices. These two insights demarcate a clear difference to the German case, where the 
employers’ camp was the key driver of short-track training. Thirdly, these same asso-
ciations demanded more influence with regard to programme development and content 
definition.
The compromise reflected in the new VET law proposal are, in part, the result of the 
negotiation process within the expert group that partly brought together the interests 
of the state, business and the unions. Nevertheless, the different positions of these actor 
groups become very clear in the reactions to the policy proposal. In Switzerland, policies 
of high relevance undergo a legislative process by consultation (Vernehmlassung). In this 
process, the state invites cantons, parties, umbrella associations representing employers, 
occupational and employee’s interests and other interested actors to comment on policy 
proposals before they enter the parliamentary debate (Bundesrat 2017). In May 1999, the 
federal economic department opened the consultation on the new VET law proposal. 
The department received 218 answers (EVD 2000). Our analysis of the responses, pre-
sented below, illustrates the above mentioned three main lines of arguments.3
Short‑tracks as  a  social measure On the one hand, we observe strong support for 
applied vocational training as a means to include disadvantaged candidates into the train-
ing system. The cantons particularly highlighted the social role of the applied vocational 
training. For the cantons, it was of high importance to guarantee permeability from the 
applied vocational training to further training options such as other levels vocational 
training (e.g. cantons Schaffhausen, Luzern, Zurich, Basel-Landschaft). In addition, the 
provision of support measures to prevent discrimination was very relevant (e.g. canton 
Nidwalden).
Unions took a similar stance. Initially, they had opposed the introduction of a new 
and lower training level as they had been afraid of a downgrading of VET (INT1, INT3, 
INT4). Instead, they had suggested that short-tracks prepare candidates for a regular 
3 This section is based on the statements of the actors in the consultation process. However, these statements are not 
public. Only an anonymized summary of the consultation results was published by the EDV in 2000. The authors of this 
paper received access to the individual responses through the federal Swiss archive in Bern under the condition not to 
publish the documents. Thus, we chose to refer to the actors but do not make their statements explicit in the reference 
list.
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training programme (INT4) and emphasised (and still do) that 3- and 4-year training 
should be the norm (INT3). However, after intense discussions within the union camp 
(INT3) their opposition weakened when the possibility of individual support measures 
was added (INT4). This changed the union’s view on short-tracks, which unions now saw 
as an opportunity to increase the number of youth in apprenticeships, especially those 
lacking academic credentials (INT3). This position was taken up by the expert group 
that developed the policy proposal. Beyond this, the unions also strongly demanded to 
guarantee the permeability from short-tracks into further training. At the same time, 
the Swiss Union Confederation (SGB) as well as the Christian National Union Confed-
eration pointed out that occupational associations should be responsible for the devel-
opment of applied training but also wanted more binding rules for the participation of 
business in training.
Interestingly, some cantons feared that the new standardization would not allow the 
training to adjust to the individual needs of the apprentice (e.g. cantons Graubünden, 
Uri, Zug). Also, some cantons argued that short-tracks would be a ‘second class’ training, 
discriminating graduates and excluding the graduates from further training options (e.g. 
the cantons Uri, Obwalden). Even though the cantons very much underlined the social 
aspect of an additional VET level, some cantons also expressed their fear that additional 
costs would keep firms from participating (e.g. canton Schaffhausen). This reflects the 
anticipation of business interests by the cantons.
Short‑tracks as  a  devaluation of  traditional VET The second line of argumentation 
views the introduction of a lower VET level as a devaluation of training and thus, rejects 
this idea (INT2). This argument was often brought forward by employer and occupational 
associations (e.g. Association of the Master Butchers, Swiss Textiles Association). In par-
ticular, those occupational fields that already had regular 2-year training programmes not 
specifically targeting disadvantaged candidates (such as the retail or dairy business) were 
afraid of a downgrading their training programmes (e.g. Swiss Association of Household 
Arts). One of the main arguments against applied vocational training was the fear of addi-
tional costs that would come with more intense supervision of weaker candidates. In the 
1990s, the employers were in the convenient position to handpick apprentices as more 
applicants were on the market than training places. From this perspective, there was no 
need for employers to demand an additional training level.
At the same time, some associations (especially occupational associations) argued that 
training for disadvantaged should not be limited to 2 years but instead more time should 
be allowed for slower learners to acquire the skills to suffice the occupational demands 
(e.g. Association of Swiss Printing Industry, Association of ICT Training). This reflects a 
measure of compassion for the disadvantaged youth on behalf of the employers, but also 
an understanding of the seriousness of the problem and the role of business as part of 
the solution.
Short‑tracks and  the  role of  the  Organizations of  the  Working World Another line of 
argument centred on the involvement of the Organizations of the Working World. Ini-
tially, the state’s proposition delegated the development of short-tracks to the cantons. 
This would imply a loss of influence for the employers and occupational associations that 
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traditionally develop the training content in VET. Therefore, the employers and occupa-
tional associations demanded to regulate short-tracks on the national level and to anchor 
their responsibilities for short-tracks in the law, like in the case of regular apprenticeships 
(e.g. Viscom, Association of Farmwomen, Swiss Insurance Association). They argued 
that cantonal variation of short-tracks would reduce their reputation. Some associations 
expressed that the law should mention the needs of the training firm next to mention-
ing the needs of the apprentice (e.g. Gastro Suisse, Association of Agronomist). Others 
underlined that graduates from applied vocational training should not be considered to 
be part of the occupational field but that a clear distinction, especially with regard to the 
certificate between the two levels of training and graduates, was needed (e.g. Associa-
tion of the Automotive Sector). In this context, it is also important to note that we do 
not observe a significant divide of preferences along firm size—which speaks against the 
presence of significant segmentalist trends in the Swiss case.
After the consultation process, the policy proposal was slightly revised along the lines 
of the employers’ camp’s wishes. One year after the consultation process, the govern-
ment published an explanatory report on the new policy proposal. In the next section, 
we focus on the specific institutionalization of short-tracks in the VET law of 2004 that 
builds on the consultation process and actors’ respective positions.
Phase III: institutionalization in the early 2000s and the VET law of 2004
In this phase, even though large parts of the business camp were initially sceptical about 
an additional layer in VET, the new VET law introduced an additional VET track by 
specifying that 2-year trainings are rewarded with a new VET certificate.
As a result of the legislative process by consultation, in 2000 the government published 
its “message on the new VET law” (Bundesrat 2000) and in 2002 the two chambers of 
the parliament passed the bill. In 2004, the new VET law entered into force. The origi-
nal policy proposal had been revised after the consultation process. For example, the 
term ‘applied vocational training’ (‘berufspraktische Bildung’) disappeared. Yet, with 
the new short-track training, an additional training option for disadvantaged formally 
entered the law without directly altering the existing character of the 3- and 4-year pro-
grammes—a form of ‘layering’ (see theory section).
The law defined that initial vocational training can take “two to four years” (BBG 2002). 
The additional training option then entered through the specification of the certification 
in relation to the duration of training. The law specifies that 3- and 4-year training pro-
grammes are awarded with a ‘Federal VET diploma’ (Eidgenössisches Fähigkeitszeugnis) 
while the 2-year training programmes led to a ‘Federal VET certificate’ (Eidgenössisches 
Berufsattest). Additionally, the law grants individual assistance and support measures to 
those apprentices who might otherwise fail their training.
From the legal perspective, this design of the short-tracks underlines the social dimen-
sion of training. It was important for the unions and the cantons to create a training 
option for disadvantaged candidates. However, the unions had to surrender on their 
demand to include binding regulations for employers and a training guarantee.
With the short-tracks, the state received a new means to integrate disadvantaged stu-
dents into dual vocational training. Short-tracks are a cheaper option than school-based 
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bridging classes. At the same time, the government found a way to keep businesses on 
board by not including binding regulations and by not changing the ‘core’ of VET, the 3- 
and 4-year training programmes, but instead to ‘layer’ the 2-year programmes onto the 
existing system. The business side, not least due to its rather united position on the pol-
icy in question, eventually gained control over the implementation of the short-tracks.
However, even though the design of the short-tracks did integrate the interests of busi-
ness, the state actors were worried whether the short-tracks would fall on fertile soil and 
take off (INT7, INT10). This is one of the main reasons why the state invests in con-
tinuous close monitoring of the development of short-tracks. At the same time, the risk 
that the state pushes equality-enhancing measures too far, thus disengaging business, is 
limited as it faces a business camp that is relatively coherent in its position that it should 
play a pivotal role in apprenticeship training, whether in the regular or the short-track 
version.
Discussion and conclusion
Globalization and liberalization pressure the institutional configuration of political 
economies with collective governance structures. Thelen (2012, 2014) argues that lib-
eralization takes place in a two-dimensional space composed of equality and strategic 
employer coordination. In our study, we show that the Swiss trajectory is ultimately not 
connected to a decline of equality or strategic employer coordination. The new training 
programmes increase equality by making it easier for disadvantaged to enter the system 
and to complete a certified training. At the same time, employer cooperation expands 
because they collectively govern the new training programmes.
In the face of the apprenticeship crisis of 1990s, employers were not willing and could 
not be forced to train more apprentices, especially with regard to weaker students. Thus, 
regular training programmes could not solve the crisis. A conversion or displacement of 
regular training programmes was not possible due to the strong influence of the business 
camp in the Swiss VET system. In addition, large-scale institutional drift did not take 
place due to the strong institutionalization of regular apprenticeships in Switzerland. In 
this political context, the most feasible choice for the state actors in the frame of dual 
VET was layering. This refers to the introduction of short-tracks as an additional new 
training level, through creating the voluntary option for employers to participate and 
investing in social support measures. Nevertheless, it was a risky decision to add a new 
training level and not everyone believed that it would work (INT10). Yet, our empirical 
findings suggest that layering in the form of short-tracks does—at least until now—not 
fundamentally undermine the traditional core of the apprenticeship training but rather 
serves to accommodate pressures for institutional change related to a changing environ-
ment and liberalization pressures.
Given that Switzerland is considered to be the most liberal collective skill formation 
system (Emmenegger et al. 2019), both the state’s capacity and the influence of the unions 
proved stronger than expected. Under pressure to bring more young people into dual 
vocational training, the state initiated the introduction of short-tracks and a correspond-
ing collective governance infrastructure, although both unions and employers initially 
opposed a lower level within VET. They were afraid of a devaluation of vocational training 
as well as additional costs that might be attached to more intense one-to-one supervision 
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of apprentices in the firm. This is one of the most important differences to the dualization 
trajectory in the German case where the demand for flexibilization is mainly driven by 
the employers’ camp, primarily dominated by large firms in the manufacturing sectors 
(Thelen and Busemeyer 2012). Furthermore, the position of the Swiss unions also differs 
from that shown in other countries where unions instead have marshalled inclusive meas-
ures in opposition to the employers (see Durazzi and Geyer 2019; Carstensen and Ibsen 
2019). Likewise, the Swiss employers were initially sceptical of more flexible training.
For the state’s initiation of short tracks, the composition of the employer’s camp played 
an important part. Switzerland is not dominated by a strong manufacturing nor export-
oriented sector per se but a rather pluralistic group of business actors (Gonon and Mau-
rer 2012; Mach and Trampusch 2011). However, we found that business was able to 
speak with a relatively coherent voice when it came to short-track training. Traditionally, 
business in Switzerland is well coordinated and organized in sectoral and occupational 
associations which can bundle the interests of their members (Trampusch 2010). These 
associations are key players in the governance of vocational training and influential, for 
instance, as they decide on the introduction of training programmes and define the con-
tent of training. The related high level of employer coordination in combination with their 
gatekeeper position enabled business to exercise power over the reform process around 
short-tracks. Employers were aware of their strong position from the very start, which is 
why they could afford to stay rather passive during the reform process.
The state took the preferences of business very seriously and delegated key compe-
tences in the governance of short-tracks to the employers. For instance, employer 
and occupational associations decide autonomously if they want to introduce a short-
track training programme in their respective sector or occupational field. In sum, the 
Swiss short-tracks can be described as politely employer-dominated, meaning that the 
employers’ camp asserted their interests in the end despite their rather passive role in 
the reform process.
Furthermore, the state did also listen to the unions and to get their support, the new 
VET law includes the possibility of state-funded individual social support measures. At 
the same time, the employers tolerated some concessions to the benefit of disadvantaged 
groups by accepting the need for (potentially) more intense supervision on a case-by-
case basis as well as a re-organization of pre-existing 2-year programmes related to new 
national level training certificates and standards.
The influential role of business distinguishes the Swiss from the Danish type of embed-
ded flexibilization. In Denmark, the strong aim to adapt the training to the most dis-
advantaged youth dictated the configuration of short-tracks rather than the perspective 
of employers. In Switzerland, even if business was not very ‘loud’, its influence on the 
design of short-tracks eventually was very strong. Their rather passive stance during the 
initial phase of the reform most likely reflects an assuredness within the business camp 
that the state would ultimately not coerce them into an arrangement they would strongly 
disagree with.
Furthermore, we did not find a strong left–right divide in the parliamentary 
debate, related to the deeply-rooted idea on both ends of the political spectrum that 
successful VET needs to be steered by the needs of the labour market actors. The 
‘strategic employer coordination’ capacities of organized interest were therefore not 
Page 18 of 21Di Maio et al. Empirical Res Voc Ed Train            (2020) 12:2 
threatened by state intervention, as identified by Thelen (2014) and Carstensen and 
Ibsen (2019) for the Danish case. In the Swiss case, employer cooperation (reflected 
in the important role of employers’ associations) remained dominant due to the 
retreat of the state from the policy issue once the initial reform steps were taken. 
Thus, the Swiss short-track reform is indicative of a new variant of embedded flexi-
bilization linked to a continued high level of equality and a maintained high level of 
strategic employer coordination.
Our findings contribute to the understanding of institutional change in the Swiss 
skill formation system. Trampusch (2010) has described change in the Swiss VET 
system as self-preserving and transformative. We add to this that the Swiss VET 
reform made the training system more flexible and accessible for disadvantaged per-
sons while maintaining a high level of employer coordination. In contrast to previous 
research on the fate of collective systems in the post-industrial era, this finding is a 
rather optimistic testimony to the promises of a collectively governed training sys-
tem that at the same time manages to provide options for weaker learners but with-
out deterring involvement of firms even in a challenging economic environment.
In this context, we also contribute to the literature on liberalization trajectories 
that has mainly referred to countries with a strong social democratic history (such as 
the Scandinavian countries) to be the typical cases of embedded flexibilization. We 
broaden this view by adding the Swiss case to the family of cases of embedded flexi-
bilization—but suggest that it is of a more employer-dominated type than in Scandi-
navia. Further research can build on these findings to measure the individual social 
mobility patterns associated with each of these institutional configurations around 
short-track training.
The insights that our study generates can also inform future policy-making that 
aims at enhancing inclusiveness. Crucially, the combination of layering with con-
tinued voluntary engagement of employers seems to be a promising strategy to 
introduce inclusion-enhancing measures. However, delegating key competences 
to business and thus having employers as gatekeepers has some limiting effects on 
inclusiveness. Therefore, in collective skill formation, as elsewhere, finding a balance 
between economic efficiency and social equality remains a complex policy challenge.
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